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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 27A OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934:
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO THE UPHEAVAL
OF THE LAMPF DECISION
On January 10, 1994 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Morgan
Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins.' The issue to be reviewed was whether Sec-
tion 27A of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is constitutional.2 Currently the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that it is,
and the Sixth has ruled it is not.' This split is the result of Congress' enactment of
legislation aimed at overruling the retroactive effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.4
Part I of this Note summarizes the issues involved in the debate over Congress'
action. Part II analyzes Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act of 1934 and
discusses the manner in which federal courts traditionally chose statutes of limitations
for lOb-5 claims before Lampf. Part III examines the Lampf decision and the retroac-
tivity of Supreme Court decisions. Part IV explains the separation of powers between
Congress and the Judiciary and discusses why Congress' intent in enacting Section
27A was a response to retroactive application of Lampf. Part V examines the argu-
ments against the constitutionality of Section 27A and the treatment this issue has
received in the federal courts. Part VI concludes that Section 27A is unconstitutional
because it is violative of the Fifth Amendment and the separation of powers doctrine.
I. SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SECTION 27A
Section 27A5 created a new generation of ancillary litigation in federal courts.6
1. 114 S. Ct. 680 (Jan. 10, 1994) sub. nor. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. v. First Republicbank, 806 F.
Supp. 108 (D.C. 1992); 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1993). Petition for writ of certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-I (1991) [hereinafter "Section 27A"].
3. Upholding the constitutionality, see, e.g., TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 997 F.2d 39 (5th Cir.
1993); Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Cooperative de Ahorro y
Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 993 F.2d 269 (lst Cir. 1993); Berning v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.
1993); Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1841 (1993); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, 971 F.2d 1567 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
95 (1993); Rejecting constitutionality, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, I F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter "Plaut II"].
4. 111 S.Ct. 2773 (1991) [hereinafter "Lampf"].
5. On December 19, 1991, President Bush signed into law Section 476 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at
Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l), which proscribed pro for-
ma retroactive application of the decision in Lampf, § 27A provides that:
(a) EFFECT ON PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION-The limitation period for any pri-
vate action implied under section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before
June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the
jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
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When Congress enacted Section 27A it overruled the retroactive application of statutes
of limitations as mandated by the Supreme Court's Lampf decision, and returned Rule
lOb-5 ' and Section 10(b)9 to the previous status as one of the more troublesome fed-
eral securities claims to bring.
In Lampf, a 5-4 majority ruled that lOb-5 claims should be governed by the
federal statute of limitations borrowed from Sections 9(e) and 18(c) of the 1934 Act.
This statute of limitations [hereinafter "the combination statute"] provides that a plain-
tiff has one year from the date of discovery of fraud or misrepresentation to press his
claim, with an absolute bar to claims three years after the acts alleged."0
The federal statute of limitation established in Lampf, was applied retroactively
to comply with another case the Supreme Court decided the same day, James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia." The Beam Court held that new rules of law are to be ap-
plied retroactively unless the Court specifically rules otherwise. 2
Prior to the Lampf decision, most federal district courts borrowed the statute of
limitations from the forum state's blue sky laws to determine the timeliness of lOb-5
claims. These state statutes of limitation ranged from one to ten years. 3
The retroactive application of the combination statute resulted in the dismissal of
hundreds of lOb-5 claims nationwide. The total aggregate value of these dismissed
claims exceeded six billion dollars."4 In response, Congress amended the Securities
Act of 1934, adding Section 27A, to prevent retroactive application of the Lampf deci-
sion required by Beam.
A. The Five Challenges to Section 27A
Section 27A is neither constitutional nor rational. It reflects a political response
to a judicially-mandated decision, and as such, fails to adequately address the statute of
(b) EFFECT ON DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION-Any private civil action implied
under section 10(b) of this Act that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991-
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the
laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws
existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff no later than
60 days after the date of enactment of this section.
6. One case alone, Anixter v. Home Stake, 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991), denied rehearing
based on the new law after the Circuit Court reversed a $142 million judgment. After 18 years of
litigation, the court ruled the claims were time barred under Lampf.
7. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
9. 15 U.S.C. §78i(e) (1988) (Throughout this Note "Section 10(b)" refers to the fraud provisions
of the Securities Act of 1934, "Rule lOb-5" refers to the Rule promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to explain the conduct prohibited by Section 10(b), and "10b-5 claims" refers to
the causes of action brought by plaintiffs implied under Rule lOb-5).
10. Lampf, Il1 S. Ct. at 2782.
11. 111 S.Ct 2439 (1991) [hereinafter "Beam"].
12. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
13. O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying the one-year Maryland blue sky
law limitations period, Md. Corp. & Assn's Code Ann. 11-703(f)); Denny v. Performance Sys., Inc.
[1971-1972] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,387 (M.D. Tenn. 1971) (applying Tennessee's ten-year limita-
tions period governing fraud, TENN. CODE ANN. 12 28-310). The previous case law is well summa-
rized in "Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions," 41 Bus. LAW. 645,
648-54 (1986), and in the 2d Circuit's opinion in Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, 918 F.2d 349,
354-55 (2d Cir. 1990).
14. Leslie Wane, "Breeden Backs Investors on Fraud Suits," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at AI0.
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limitations problem or prescribe a viable solution. Section 27A was the product of
popular unrest. For reasons to be discussed, its language and effect do not address the
problems indicated in its legislative history as the reason for its enactment.
Several federal judges, whose tenure, unlike members of Congress, does not
depend on popular mandate, have held Section 27A unconstitutional for numerous
reasons.15 First, these courts hold that Section 27A merely instructs the courts to ig-
nore the Supreme Court's decision in Beam, 6 thereby violating the separation of
powers doctrine. 7
Second, the language of Section 27A directs a particular result in a limited group
of cases. The legislative history indicates that Congress "was tacitly directing a result
in the cases of those individuals whom Congress held in low esteem"'8 namely, the
primary defendants in the insider trading cases of the late 1980s. This special treatment
of specific insider traders directly contradicts the holding in United States v. Klein. 9
Klein held that Congress may not prescribe a particular rule of decision to cases pend-
ing in federal court.2"
Third, while two Courts of Appeal2' point to the recent decision in Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon22 to bolster their belief that Section 27A is constitutional, these
courts are misguided in that the Seattle Audubon decision does not apply to Article III
challenges or choice of law issues.23 As addressed in the Sixth Circuit's decision of
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms,24 the crux of the Seattle Audubon decision was that Con-
gress may change the underlying law that supports a claim, and thereby change the
position of litigants that are currently pressing them.' However, when no law under-
lying a claim exists, as is the case in statute of limitations of implied causes of action,
15. Cases finding § 27A unconstitutional include: Dulude v. Cigna Secs., Inc., No. 90-CV-72191-
DT (E.D.Mich. 1992); Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., No. C-90-2600 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 1992) (ruling
that Section 27A contravenes the constitutional decision in Beam ); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
789 F. Supp. 231 (E.D.Ky. 1992) [hereinafter "Plaut I"] (ruling that §27A directs federal courts to
reverse or suspend final judgments); In re Brichard Secs. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D.Cal. 1992)
(ruling that Section 27A violates separation of powers principles by prescribing the rule of decision in
pending cases, by subjecting final judgments of federal courts to reversal or review and by contradict-
ing constitutional decision of Supreme Court); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc.,
789 F. Supp. 1092 (D.Colo. 1992) (ruling that Section 27A prescribes the rule of decision in particular
cases, encroaches on the judiciary's power to interpret the law); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp.
587 (E.D.La. 1992) (holding that although Section 27A does change law, the statute is unconstitutional
because it is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of Beam); Johnston v. CIGNA, 789 F. Supp.
1098 (D.Colo. 1992); Howard Treiber, et al, v. Katz, et al, No. 90-CV-70374, (E.D.Mich. 1992);
Hindler, Inc. v. Telequest, Melridge, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 87-1426-JU, (D.Or. 1992); In re
Taxable Municipal Bond Securities Litigation, No. CIV-A-MDL863, 1992 WL 119990 (E.D.La. 1992).
16. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1103; Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097; Plaut 1, 789 F.
Supp. at 235; Johnson, 789 F. Supp. at 1101.
17. United States v. O'Grady 89 U.S. 641, 647-48, (1894) (ruling it is the exclusive power of the
judiciary to adjudicate cases).
18. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1106, (citing 137 Cong. Rec. H 11,811 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991)).
19. 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 126 (1871).
20. Id. at 167.
21. Anixter v. Home-Stake Productions Co., 977 F.2d 1549, 1559 (10th Cir. 1992); Henderson v.
Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1574 (lth Cir. 1992).
22. 112 S.Ct 1407 (1992).
23. Id. at 1412 (After finding the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously ruled the law direct-
ed findings of fact the Court stated, "We have no occasion to address any broad questions of Article
III jurisprudence.").
24. 1 F.3d 1487 (6th Cir. 1993).
25. Id. at 1497.
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Congress has no right to amend the law so as to effect pending cases.26 Since a lOb-5
claim is a judicially created cause of action, Congress overstepped its authority in
trying to amend the Lampf decision which concerned lOb-5 claims."'
Fourth, district courts have ruled that applying Section 27A(b) violates the Fifth
Amendment. This subsection resurrects claims dismissed in the period after Lampf and
before Section 27A's enactment.28 Numerous district courts have ruled that resurrect-
ing dismissed claims pursuant to Section 27A(b) violates both the Fifth Amendment
and the "vested rights" doctrine because the defendants to those actions had vested
rights in the dismissal of the claims against them.29
Finally, the stated purpose of Section 27A was to ensure that all Rule lob-5
litigants were treated fairly and equitably.3" A uniform federal rule applied retroac-
tively would have such an effect. It is patently unfair that a federal law can be en-
forced in one state under a ten year statute of limitation, while citizens of another state
only have one year to press their federal claim.3
II. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 OF THE 1934
SECURITIES ACT
In response to the stock market crash in 1929, the United States Congress enact-
ed the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.32 The Acts require registration of stock of-
ferings, periodic reports of a corporation's financial status, and distribution of certain
information to prospective purchasers. The penalties for engaging in fraudulent activi-
ties are defined in the rules which accompany the Acts. The activity addressed by Rule
lob-5 of the 1934 Act is well-defined.33 To prove a claim under Section 10(b) or
Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that the defendant, with scienter, made a
misrepresentation of a material fact or failed to disclose a material fact, and that the
plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or omission and suffered a loss as a result of
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1498.
28. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1106-1107; Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097; Johnson, 789
F. Supp. at 1103.
29. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
30. 137 CONG. REC. S18,624 (Nov. 27, 1991) (Statement of Senator Bryan, "We are only ad-
-dressing the most immediate problem - the unfair application of the Supreme Court's Lampf decision
to cases that were pending at the time that the decision came down.").
31. See supra note 13.
32. The 1929 crash in large part occurred due to speculation associated with the value of stock.
Through various fraudulent schemes, the entire stock system, as it existed, collapsed in 1929. To pre-
vent another crash, Congress acted swiftly and enacted two major regulatory acts in two years. The
1933 Act regulates the actions of corporations who issue stock. The 1934 Act is primarily concerned
with regulating secondary resellers and requiring corporations to file periodic reports as to the condi-
tion and financial future of their corporations.
33. Commission Rule lOb-5, first promulgated in 1942, now provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstanc-
es under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
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the misrepresentation or omission. 4 However, Congress did not include a statute of
limitations for Rule lOb-5 because it did not enact the rule to provide for private suits.
Courts interpreting Rule lOb-5 found an implied cause of action35 which allows pri-
vate litigants to pursue individual claims against parties who engage in acts contraven-
ing Rule l0b-5.36
A. Determining the Statute of Limitation in 10b-5 Claims Prior to Lampf
When courts interpreted Rule 1Ob-5 as granting an implied cause of action, they
had to determine what statute of limitation to apply.37 Courts would normally borrow
the forum state's statute of limitations for blue sky laws similar to Section 10(b) or
state common law fraud, to determine if the lOb-5 claim was timely.3" 'This
'borrowing' of state law accorded with the traditional practice of looking to the law of
the forum state to provide a limitations period for federal claims when federal law is
silent on the applicable limitations period."'3 9
Because of the nature of this implied action, class actions and multidistrict claims
became especially unwieldy.' Insider trading scandals of the 1980s prompted hun-
dreds of investors nationwide to file lOb-5 claims.4 With suits arising that involved
multiple parties, class actions, and multidistrict actions, district courts were unable to
find a single state's law that could apply to all parties in an action, and thus, choice of
law questions became the predominant inquiry to determine timeliness."2 The Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated several of these suits for pretrial discovery.43
Still the question that eluded several judges remained: "What is the correct statute of
limitations?"
34. See, e.g., Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.
1985).
35. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210-211 & n.29 (1976).
36. Herrman & MacLean v. Huddlestrom, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (recognizing an individual
cause of action based on Rule lOb-5).
37. Herrman & MacLean, at 384; see also, Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979) (discussion of the remedies available under implied causes of action).
38. "It is the usual rule that when Congress has failed to provide a statute of limitations for a
federal cause of action the court 'borrows' or 'absorbs' the local time limitation most analogous to the
case at hand." Lampf, at 2778, (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985)); See also,
Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966).
39. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 556 n.27 (1974); Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-05 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395
(1946).
40."The multistate nature of [the federal cause of action at issue] indicates the desirability
of a uniform federal statute of limitations. With the possibility of multiple state limita-
tions, the use of state statutes would present the danger of forum shopping and, at the
very least, would 'virtually guarante[el . . . complex and expensive litigation over what
should be a straightforward matter."'
Lampf at 2779, (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146
(1987)).
41. For an accurate and in depth examination of the entire insider-trading scandal, see JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES, 1992.
42. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, No. 90-333, Decem-
ber 5, 1990.
43. See In re General Development Corp. Bond Lit., 800 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
44. See, e.g., In re Clinton Oil Co. Securities Litigation, [1977-19781 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
P96,015 (D. Kan. 1977) (transferee court in Multidistrict litigation was forced to select a different
limitation period for each of several consolidated actions involving the identical violation). See also
Pinney v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 735 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (discussing five options avail-
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As a result of the confusion in multidistrict and class action cases, the need for a
federal statute of limitations became clear.45 Therefore, when the Supreme Court ac-
cepted certiorari to consider the issue, they entered into an area that was ripe for clari-
fication.46
III. THE LAMPF DECISION
The major issue surrounding Larnpf is not whether the Court selected the most
analogous state statute of limitations, but rather, whether the new federal rule an-
nounced applies to cases pending at the time Lampf was rendered. The majority in
Lampf applied the new limitations period retroactively to the parties before it without
any analysis, despite a strongly worded dissent by Justice O'Connor on this point.47
Prior to Lampf, three Circuits adopted the combination statute for use in lOb-5 claims.
These three circuits reached mixed conclusions on the issue of retroactivity. The Third
Circuit applied its new rule retroactively,4" the Second Circuit declined to do so,49
and the Seventh Circuit in two separate cases avoided the issue altogether,50 or left it
for district courts to decide.
In Lampf, the Supreme Court could only reach agreement on three issues. The
Court agreed that there was a need for a federal statute of limitations for Rule lob-5
actions. Next, The Court concluded that the most appropriate statute for this purpose
was the combination statute applicable to express causes of actions for manipulation
and for filing false and misleading SEC reports contained in Sections 9(c) and 18(e) of
the 1934 Act.52 The Court also agreed that the new statute would apply retroactive-
ly.
53
Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Rehnquist, White, Marshall, and Scalia joined. Justice Blackmun used a "hierarchical
analysis" to determine the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to apply
a federal statute of limitations to implied causes of action. Although technically not the
opinion of the Court, since only three justices joined him,' Justice Blackmun's hier-
able to courts attempting to set limitations periods applicable to non-resident class claims); Kronfeld v.
Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1457-58 & n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (borrowing statute resulted in appli-
cation of at least 26 separate statutes of limitations).
45. See Lampf supra note 38. (The problems associated with borrowing state statute of limitations
created incredible legal headaches for multistate and class action securities claims. See e.g. Norris v.
Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987) (characterizing the
borrowing process as applied in multistate claims as "one tottering parapet of a ramshackle edifice.").
46. Both the Petitioners and the SEC agreed that a single federal statute of limitations was neces-
sary. See supra note 38; Brief for Petitioner, 90-333, at 9 (1991).
47. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2785 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (arguing that precedent solidly demon-
strated that the case was not time-barred. Justice O'Connor concluded that holding a claim as untimely
as measured against a rule that did not exist when the case was filed was manifestly unfair and that
the Majority's action was altogether inappropriate as the Supreme Court had never before applied a
newly found statute of limitations retroactively).
48. Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1988).
49. Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1989).
50. Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990).
51. Radiology Center S.C. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 919 F.2d 1216, 1223 (7th Cir. 1990).
52. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n. 10, (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i and 781 (et seq.)). The Court ruled
that the specific terms of 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) would be considered for questions of statutory construc-
tion.
53. Lampf Il1 S. Ct. at 2782.
54. Justice Scalia did not concur in Justice Blackmun's use of the "hierarchical analysis." Liampf
111 S. Ct. at 2783.
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archical analysis clarifies the role the Court assumed in applying the combination stat-
ute.5" The Court considered federal borrowing "a closely circumscribed exception," to
be made "only when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer
analogy than available state statutes and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for
interstitial lawmaking."56
Using his "hierarchical analysis" Justice Blackmun explained why state "borrow-
ing" is unwise in Rule lOb-5 cases. "First the court must determine whether a uniform
statute of limitations is to be selected.""7 This is appropriate "where a federal cause of
action tends in practice to 'encompass numerous diverse topics and subtopics."' 58 Jus-
tice Blackmun argued that this was the case with lOb-5 claims as prosecution under
Rule lOb-5 often resulted "[such] that a single state statute may not be consistently
applied within a jurisdiction, the [Supreme Court has] concluded -that federal interests
in predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of
sources, for borrowing purposes.""
Second, assuming a uniform limitations period is appropriate, the court must
decide whether the period should be gleaned from state or federal sources. "[T]he
court should accord particular weight to the geographic character of the claim. '
When the claim is multi-state in nature with the possibility of multiple state statutes of
limitations, Blackmun stated that the court should lean towards use of a federal statute
of limitations to avoid forum shopping and expensive litigation over the appropriate
statute of limitations.6
If forum shopping and cost benefit considerations balance in favor of federal
borrowing, the courts must still consider a final factor. The courts must make a deter-
mination whether a federal statute clearly provides a closer fit than any available state
statute. 62
This final step of Blackmun's "hierarchical inquiry" applies where an express
cause of action exists in the same statute under which the implied cause of action
arises.63 In these cases, the courts should give first consideration to the statute of limi-
tations for that express action.'
Where the claim asserted is implied from a statute that also contains an express
cause of action with a time limitation, the Court stated, courts should first look to "the
statute of origin" to determine the correct limitations period:65
We can imagine no closer indication of how Congress would have balanced the
policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck
by the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections ... 66 [w]hen the
55. Lampf, Il1 S. Ct. at 2777.
56. Lampf II1 S. Ct. at 2778 (quoting Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)).
57. Lampf I11 S. Ct. at 2778.
58. Id.
59. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2279 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273-75 (1985)).
60. Lampf, 1It S. Ct. at 2779.
61. Id. (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 157
(1987)).
62. Id.
63. Lampf itI S. Ct. at 2778.
64. Lampf III S. Ct. at 2779.
65. Id.
66. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780, (citing DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
1994]
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statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions, the inquiry
usually should be at an end. Only when no analogous counterpart is available
should a court then proceed to apply state borrowing principles .. 6
The task of determining whether a statute of limitations within the 1934 Act
provides a closer fit than state statutes is complicated by the technical nature of Sec-
tion 10(b) cases." The Court determined that two sections of the 1934 Act' protect
investors from the same fraudulent conduct that forms the basis of Section 10(b), pro-
hibiting the manipulation of stock prices and imposing regular reporting requirements
on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges."0
Additionally, when Congress enacted the 1934 Act, it specifically, amended the
1933 Act to incorporate a one and three year limitation period for all actions contained
in the 1934 Act. The Court in Lampf thus concluded that Congress intended to apply
the one and three year limitation period broadly to the Securities field." Therefore, all
of the considerations forwarded by Justice Blackmun weighed in favor of borrowing a
statute of limitations from the Securities Act itself. That statute applied to actions for
willful manipulation and misleading filings, two activities that closely resemble the
conduct underlying a lOb-5 claim.
The Court rejected the SEC's position that the five-year statute of limitation
found in Section 20A of the 1934 Act would be more appropriate to 10b-5 claims."2
The Court held that there was no evidence to support the belief that Congress intended
to apply this scheme to anything other than insider trading violations. The Court noted,
in dicta, that Congress included language specifically stating that nothing in the section
would be construed to affect the availability of any other cause of action implied by
the statute. 3
As a final matter, the Supreme Court rejected the SEC's contention that the
adoption of a one and three year period of limitation would frustrate the purposes of
U.s. 151, 171 (1983)).
67. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780.
68. The 1934 Act contains a number of express causes of action-Sections 9(e), 18(c), and
29(b)-each with an explicit limitations period which contains some variation of the one year and
three year combination statute. The Court determined that two of these express causes of action-
Sections 9 and 18-were analogous to Section 10(b) actions. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2780-81. (Section 9
deals with willful manipulation of securities prices. Section 18 relates to making false or misleading
filings to the SEC).
69. Section 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i, pertaining to the willful manipulation of security
prices, and Section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r, relating to misleading filings, target the precise dangers that
are the focus of Section 10(b). Each is an integral element of a complex web of regulations. Each
was intended to facilitate a central goal: "to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices
through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to
impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities ex-
changes." Lampf, Ill S. Ct. at 2781, (quoting Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195, citing S. Rep. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934)).
70. Lampf II1 S. Ct. at 2778.
71. In a footnote, the Supreme Court explained that Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b), set a two-year rather than three-year period of limitations, but held that, since the statute dealt
with disgorgement of profits and differed in focus from the other sections, it was not an appropriate
source from which to borrow a limitations period. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780, n.5.
72. Section 20A, the Court explained, is part of ITSFEA which was added 54 years after enact-
ment of the 1934 Act, and focuses specifically on misuse of inside information, for which, Congress
recognized, it was difficult to uncover evidence. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2781.
73. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2782.
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Section 10(b).74 The Court held that the period provided sufficient time to allow the
victims of fraud to discover and file their claims."
The Supreme Court, by dismissing the plaintiffs' claims under Rule lOb-5, also
implicitly determined that the combination statute applied retroactively to lOb-5 claims
already within the federal court system.76 Announced the same day as Lampf, the Su-
preme Court's Beam decision determined that all newly found rules of law were to be
given retroactive effect, thereby mandating the application of the combination statute to
all pending lOb-5 claims.
A. Retroactivity of Supreme Court Decisions
In decisions prior to Beam, federal courts used the test fashioned by the Supreme
Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson7" to determine if new rules of decision should be
applied prospectively or retroactively. In Chevron Oil, the Court ruled that for a court
decision to apply only prospectively, it must "establish a new principle of law, either
by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, ... or by decid-
ing an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed . . . ."" If this requirement is satisfied, a court should then weigh in each case
whether retroactive application would conflict with the purposes of the rule and wheth-
er it would produce inequitable results.79
1. The Modem Rule of Retroactivity: James B. Beam Distilling v. Georgia
The Supreme Court consistently followed Chevron Oils° until its decision in
Beam." The issue in Beam was whether a 1984 Supreme Court decision invalidating
a Hawaii state tax should be applied retroactively.82 This tax applied a higher rate to
imported alcohol products than domestic products.83
In a plurality decision, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, rejected the
Chevron Oil analysis, holding instead that "principles of equality and stare decisis"
controlled and required the 1984 decision to be given retroactive effect.'
Despite the concurrence of six Justices in the judgment of the Court, there was
no majority agreement as to the basis for the holding. They simply rejected selective
prospectivity, a practice whereby a court "applies a new rule in the case in which it is
pronounced, then returns to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts pre-
74. Lampf Il11 S. Ct. at 2781.
75. Id.
76. Beam, II1 S. Ct. at 2448. ("When the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one
case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata.").
77. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
78. Id. at 106-07 (regarding the unforsecability in terms of Section 27A, it is telling that the
Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits had already adopted the one and three year combination statute.
Therefore, it is hard to say that the Lampf decision was not foreshadowed. See supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text).
79. Id.
80. American Trucking Ass'n Inc. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2333-35 (1990); St. Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1987).
81. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). See generally Block & Hall, Securities Law Developments End Su-
preme Court Term, NEW YORK L.J., July 18, 1991, at 5.
82. Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
83. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2445.




Justice Souter reasoned that "retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as
a matter of choice of law,"' and that selective prospectivity "breaches the principle
that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component
of stare decisis and the rule of law generally."87 Justice Souter determined that selec-
tive prospectivity violates Article III of the Constitution. The opinion held that it is
"error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively [to other similar situated
litigants in prior cases] after the case announcing the rule has already done so.''88
Justices Blackmun, Scalia and Marshall, in contrast, based their concurrences on
constitutional principles. Specifically, the Blackmun and Scalia pluralities reasoned that
selective prospectivity conflicts with the dictates of Article III. The courts may "decide
only 'cases' and 'controversies. ' '89 "Unlike a legislature," Justice Blackmun wrote,
[wie do not promulgate new rules to 'be applied prospectively only,' .... The
nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually before
us, and, if it requires us to announce a new rule, to do so in the context of the case
and apply it to the parties who brought us the case to decide. To do otherwise is to
warp the role that we, as judges, play in a government of limited powers.'
Although only three Justices articulated a constitutional basis for the holding,
several district courts interpreting the decision attach constitutional weight to it.
91
2. The Effect of Beam on Lampf
It is not clear that the majority in Lampf relied on Beam because it applied the
new limitations rule retroactively without discussion. In the six months between Lampf
and the passage of Section 27A, however, numerous district courts as well as the Sec-
ond, Eighth and Tenth Circuits ruled that the new limitations period of one year from
the date of discovery with an absolute bar after three years announced in Lampf ap-
plied retroactively. 92 Without question, before Congress acted, it was the unanimous
opinion of the federal judiciary that Beam made Lampf retroactive.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS QUESTIONS BETWEEN THE SUPREME
COURT AND CONGRESS
Congress cannot prescribe a rule of decision for the judiciary.93 Nor can Con-
85. Id. at 2444.
86. Id. at 2443.
87. Id. at 2443-44.
88. Id. at 2446.
89. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2449-50.
91. TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. at 593 (Beam opinion states "constitutional mandate");
In re Brichard Securities Lit., 788 F. Supp. at 1109 (holding Beam to be a constitutional decision).
92. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1991), reh'g. denied,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24818 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 1991); Welch v. Cadre Capital, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 96,287; Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 96,194; Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 766 F. Supp. 497,
499 (S.D.W.Va. 1991); Baggett v. Edward D. Jones & Co., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) para. 96,215.
93. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146, (1871) (holding that a legislative enact-
ment which changed the effect of a civil war pardon in cases where the pardoned sought to regain
seized property impermissibly "prescribe[d] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way.").
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gress enact a law that effects a rule of decision without changing the underlying proce-
dural or substantive law, or otherwise contravene the Constitution by contradicting a
Constitutional decision by the Court.'
A. The Seminal Case for Separation of Powers Analysis: United States v. Klein
United States v. Klein,95 an 1871 case, involved a statute under which residents
of former Confederate states could recover property upon proof of loyalty to the feder-
al government. The administrator of a deceased Confederate sympathizer's estate
brought suit in the Court of Claims to obtain the proceeds of property that had been
seized and sold by the Government during the Civil War." A federal statute allowed
for such recovery upon proof of the claimant's loyalty during the war.
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had ruled that the grant of a presidential
pardon to ex-Confederate property owners was "proof of loyalty" sufficient to satisfy
the statute.9" Klein had received such a pardon, and thus, the Court of Claims held his
estate was entitled to the proceeds from the seized property.
During the pendency of the government's appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress
enacted legislation which provided that a presidential pardon was not admissible as
evidence of loyalty.9" Congress changed the rule of decision making a pardon conclu-
sive evidence of disloyalty rather than evidence of loyalty."
The Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional."° The Court determined
that Congress had violated the separation of powers by "prescrib[ing] a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way."'' The statute impermissibly mandated
courts to accept factual findings regarding the effect of a pardon.
B. Klein Revisited: The Supreme Court Clarifies Congress' Power in Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon
While Klein has historically been the touchstone of a separation of powers inqui-
ry, the Supreme Court's recent decision in the separation of powers context, Robertson
v. Seattle Audubon," may provide more insight. In Seattle Audubon, environmental
groups asserted that the federal government's regulation of timber harvesting in the
Pacific Northwest granted the northern spotted owl too little protection.
As with Lampf, Congress responded with compromise legislation. 3 The statute
established certain harvesting restrictions and noted that the standards set were ade-
quate to meet the statutory requirements cited in the pending litigation.
The plaintiffs challenged the compromise legislation as violating Article III. They
94. In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (N.D.Cal. 1992) (referring to Section
27A's effect of contravening Beam, a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court).
95. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
96. Id. at 132.
97. Id. at 133.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 145-46.
100. Id. at 147.
101. Id. at 146.
102. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
103. Congress enacted Section 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act, 1990, also known as the "Northwest Timber Compromise," in response to ongoing litiga-




claimed it purported to direct the results in two pending cases."° Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Justice Thomas reversed the decision. The legislation, Justice Thomas
wrote, had changed the law governing endangered species, and the pending cases were
referenced only to identify the statutory provisions in question."° , The Court reasoned
that the operation of the new subsection "modified the old provisions" and did not
"direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to fact."'"
The statute did not pass on "the 'legal or factual adequacy' of administrative docu-
ments authorizing the sales""° or "instruct the courts" how to decide whether particu-
lar timber sales violated [the Act]."' Therefore, Congress had acted within its Con-
stitutional power by amending substantive parts of a federal legislation.
C. The Congressional Response to the Tumult of Lampf: Section 27A
The lOb-5 claims dismissed by Lampf presented a very problematic situation for
federal legislators. Put simply, many of the lOb-5 claims were part of larger insider
trading fraud cases. In the late 1980s it was these insider trading cases that provided
the impetus for change to the Securities Act."° Therefore, these dismissals were giv-
en priority treatment in Congress. "' Several members of Congres spoke at great
length denouncing the effect of the Lampf decision, and targeting the particular defen-
dants they believed would get away if private plaintiffs were not allowed to press their
lOb-5 claims.
1. The Senate Hearings on Lampf
In hearings conducted before the Senate, SEC chairman Richard Breeden advo-
cated that Congress implement a two and five year combination statute."' He rea-
soned that the Lampf rule provided an unreasonably short period of limitations that
would reduce the viability of private suits under Section 10(b)."' Breeden called this
statute of limitations, "unrealistically short," and would cause "undue damage to pri-
vate litigation ... sharply limit[ing] the number of cases that will be brought.""3
The SEC recognizes that the motivation to press private suits is an integral part
104. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the provision unconstitutional because it (referring to § 318)
"does not, by its plain language, repeal or amend the environmental laws underlying this litigation,"
but rather "[subsection (b)(6)(a)] directs the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual
findings under existing law in connection with two cases pending in federal court"; Seattle Audubon
Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
105. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414.
106. Id. at 1413.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-
l(b)(4) (1988).
110. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. Hl,811-12 (daily ed., Nov. 26, 1991) (Statement of Rep. Dingell).
"This provision is critically important because Lampf has resulted in the dismissal of many private rule
lOb-5 actions against figures in major financial scandals including Charles Keating, Michael Milken
and others. Those cases can now be reinstated .... " Representative Dingell later wrote to the Chair-
man of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, "In light of your Committee's exten-
sive hearings on Charles Keating . . . we hope you will support this result." 137 CONG. REC. HII,811
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).
111. "Breeden Endorses Bill to Reverse Decision on § 10b Limitations Period," 23 SEC. REG. &





of SEC regulation."' The fear of a private antitrust or securities claim persuades is-
suers and secondary resellers to comply with the stringent regulations the SEC prof-
fers. Therefore, the SEC felt that any statute of limitations that allowed suits to be dis-
missed would negatively effect the enforcement processes."5 The SEC's position was
the impetus for the Congresional action at the heart of this debate.
2. Analysis of Section 27A and its Effects
To ensure that private prosecution of inside traders would continue, Congress
buried within the Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991,"'
the provision adding Section 27A to the 1934 Exchange Act. This section was de-
signed to address the perceived plight of plaintiffs in the hundreds of federal lOb-5
claims that were dismissed by Lampf and Beam.' Congress enacted Section 27A
intending to reinstate for these plaintiffs the right to redress their grievances removed
by way of Lampf and Beam. Instead, it spawned a new wave of ancillary litigation
challenging the constitutionality of Section 27A and weighing the merits of reinstating
previously dismissed claims. The question turned from which state's law to apply, to
whether the federal law was constitutional.
In the weeks following the enactment of Section 27A, many of the claims extin-
guished by Lampf were reinstated. Several others were not, as district court judges
ruled that Congress had stepped beyond its constitutional power and impermissibly
violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine."' Another district court reinstated claims
thus implicitly rejecting the notion that Section 27A was unconstitutional." 9 Still oth-
er courts reinstated lOb-5 claims without consideration of the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 27A.2 Other district courts ruled Section 27A was constitutional.,
V. THE ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING SECTION 27A
No language in Section 27A changes the law; the statute merely prohibits the
retroactive application of the Lampf decision. As of this writing there is still no express
statute of limitations within Section 10(b). Congress did not enact a uniform statute of
114. "[Plrivate actions provide 'a most effective weapon in the enforcement' of the securities laws
and are 'a necessary supplement to Commission action."' Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (quoting J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
115. See supra note I11.
116. S.543 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); See, 137 CONG. REC. SI0,675 (Nov. 21, 1991).
117. See supra note I11.
118. See supra note 16.
119. See Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 751 n.6 (2d Cir. 1992)
("Although the parties have not suggested that section 27A is unconstitutional, we are aware that sev-
eral district courts have so held, but, like Judges Conner and Lasker, we are unimpressed by the co-
gency of their analysis.").
120. These courts rely on Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) ("Prior to reaching any con-
stitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-constitutional grounds for decision.").
121. District courts finding Section 27A constitutional: Rabin v. Fivzar, 801 F. Supp. 1045
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that § 27A(a) did not violate separation of powers or 5th Amendment due
process); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (addressing separation of pow-
ers, due process and equal protection issues); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (failing to address equal protection issues); Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 790 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, No. 89-2423-0, 1992 WL 80622
(D.Kan. Mar. 5, 1992) (addressing separation of powers issue); Ayers v. Sutliffe, No. C-1-90-630, slip
op., 1992 WL 100132 (S.D.Oh. Feb. 11, 1992) (addressing separation of powers and equal protection
issues); Venturtech 11, Ltd. v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (addressing
separation of powers, due process and equal protection issues).
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limitations, instead, it passed Section 27A(a) which allows plaintiffs to renew claims
that would otherwise be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds had Lampf been
applied retroactively.' Section 27A(b) forces federal courts to reinstate claims that
were dismissed under Lampf1
23
A. The Klein Argument Against Section 27A
For many courts, Section 27A falls impermissibly within the parameters deter-
mined to be the sole province of the Supreme Court. 24 This is the modern interpreta-
tion of the decision of United States v. Klein. 25 Just as Klein directed that Congress
could not "prescribe rules of decision to the judicial department of the government in
cases pending before it,"' 25 federal courts considering Section 27A have concluded
that "Congress cannot direct federal courts to ignore Supreme Court precedent in a
discrete category of pending cases without violating the separation of powers princi-




The SEC maintains that Section 27A does not violate the Klein principle. The
SEC asserts that Section 27A merely removes from defendants a procedural defense of
statute of limitations without prescribing the outcome of the litigation. 29 The SEC
bases its position on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians 3°
In Sioux Nation the Supreme Court ordered the Court of Claims to allow Native
American plaintiffs to relitigate claims that had been earlier dismissed. By doing so,
the Supreme Court removed the procedural defense of res judicata from the defendant,
the United States. The case concerned a debt allegedly owed by the government. That
debt, unlike alleged compensatory damages under the Securities Laws, was concrete
and provable. Therefore, the facts and the effect of Sioux Nation are distinguishable
from the issues and facts concerning Lampf and Beam.
In addition, the Sioux Nation Court determined that removing a procedural de-
fense from a litigant does not violate Klein. 3' However, this reasoning is inapplicable
to the Section 27A inquiry. The key issue is not whether Section 27A removes a pro-
cedural defense, but whether it grants exemption from retroactive application of a
122. See supra note 5. (Section 27A(a) directs courts to apply the limitation period under Section
10(b) to claims commenced on or before June 19, 1991, provided by the laws applicable in the juris-
diction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991).
123. Id. (Section 27A(b) directs courts to reinstate cases dismissed as time-barred subsequent to
June 19, 1991 if they would have been timely under the law existing on that date).
124. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, I F.3d 1487 [hereinafter "Plaut II"] (6th Cir. 1993).
125. 80 U.S. at 128.
126. Id. at 146.
127. Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1098; see also, In re Brichard Securities Lit., 788 F. Supp.
at 1106, (quoting Klein, at 147-48), ("Congress left Lanpf untouched but instructed the courts to apply
it to a certain group of cases. As in Klein, the "great and controlling purpose" was to direct the out-
come in specific cases without changing the law.").
128. Henderson v. Scientific Am., 971 F.2d 1567, 1576 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
129. "SEC Files Joint Brief with Department of Justice, Arguing that Statute of Limitations Provi-
sion in § 27A of the Securities Exchange Act Is Constitutional." SEC News Release 92-20, 1992 WL
83265 (S.E.C.) (arguing in the Henderson Case before the 1 1th Circuit that the defendants' claim of
unconstitutionality was unfounded).
130. Plaut 11, i F.3d at 1497-98 (holding that Congress' rescission of a technical procedural de-




Supreme Court decision. If anything, Sioux Nation supports the Supreme Court's abili-
ty to retroactively amend a procedural defense, but does not provide a basis for Con-
gress to overrule the Supreme Court.
B. If Beam Was Decided Under the Constitution, Congress Cannot Enact
Legislation to Overrule its Application in the Federal Courts
When the Supreme Court finds a new rule of law and applies that law to the
litigants in a civil case, the rule applies retroactively to all pending cases.'32 The en-
actment of Section 27A runs contrary to this principle. The Supreme Court left plain-
tiffs in Lampf without recourse, while other similarly situated litigants who filed their
claims later, still enjoyed the protection of their states' statutes of limitation.'33 It is
counterintuitive to the purpose of the statute not to have Lampf apply retroactively."3
Congress was concerned with equitable and uniform handling of federal claims to all
citizens. To allow state law to dictate the statute of limitations, perpetuates a non-uni-
form application of the Securities Act to residents of different states.
Some courts have found it persuasive that Justice Souter cited Supreme Court
precedent to determine that the Constitution mandated retroactive application of new
rules of law to pending cases. 35 "The constitutional grounds for Beam may be
mixed," said one court, "however, the end result is that Beam is based on the Constitu-
tion."'" As a constitutionally based decision, Beam would be outside the power of
Congress to amend by legislation.'37
C. The Separation of Powers Argument: Congress Cannot Act as a
Super-Appellate Court
The Klein argument aside, the Separation of Powers Doctrine is also violated
when Congress seeks to reverse a Supreme Court decision. To preserve the separation
of powers, Congress is forbidden from enacting a law that reverses or allows for re-
view of a final judgment of either the Supreme Court or lower federal courts. 3 s Sec-
tion 27A does just that and as such violates the principle of separation of powers.'39
Section 27A, in one court's words, "did not enact a statute of limitations for
[Rule] lOb-5 cases, but left the Lampf rule untouched."'" Section 27A intrudes upon
the adjudicative function of the courts by mandating "what rule may not be applied,
even though it did not enact a substantive or procedural law.''. Another court said
that Congress "effectively acted as a 'super-appellate court,' overturning Lampf without
132. Beam, II1 S. Ct. at 2447-48.
133. Section 27A revives the statute of limitation for claims filed before June 19, 1991. The plain-
tiffs in Lampf filed their actions on November 3, 1986. Under the Lampf decision, the named
plaintiffs' claims are untimely, while claims filed between November 3, 1986 and June 19, 1991 are
still viable under the plaintiffs' forum states' statute of limitation. See infra note 149.
134. See supra note 29.
135. TGX v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. at 592.
136. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1111-1112.
137. Plaut II, I F.3d at 1499.
138. Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
139. For a more in-depth analysis of Section 27A's infringement. upon the Separation of Powers
Doctrine read Judge Legge's decision in In re Brichard Securities Litigation, 788 F. Supp. 1098
(N.D.Cal. 1992).
140. Id. at 1103.
141. Brichard, 788 F. Supp at 1104.
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replacing that decision with any new law."'42
D. The Fifth Amendment Prohibition Against Resurrecting Final Judgments as a
Bar to Section 27A
Subsection (b) of Section 27A requires federal courts to reinstate, upon motion
by the plaintiffs, any lOb-5 claim pending on the date Lampf was announced and dis-
missed prior to the enactment of Section 27A.' Section 27A(b) raises particularly
difficult constitutional issues because it directs the reversal of final judgments entered
by federal courts. Such an edict clashes directly with the venerable principle that "Con-
gress cannot reverse or suspend a specific decision of a federal court."'" As one
court put it, federal judges are mindful that an erosion of this principle might transform
their purportedly final judgments into "advisory opinions."'45 The result would be "a
legislative appeal of judicial action" that was never intended by the framers of the
Constitution.'"
Section 27A(b) allows plaintiffs to reinstate previously dismissed anti-fraud
claims provided they fulfill the requirements set forth in the statute. 47 Defendants
challenging Section 27A(b) claim the act violates Fifth Amendment due process be-
cause it directs federal courts to reverse or suspend final judgments. Indeed, under the
vested rights doctrine, the legislature may not, consistent with Article III and the Fifth
Amendment, direct the reversal or suspension of a decision of a federal court,' or
take away rights which have been once vested by judgment. 49 However, absent the
entry of a final judgment, the dismissal of an action as time-barred does not vest the
prevailing party with any property rights. 5t
The case perhaps most often cited for the vested rights doctrine is McCullough v.
Virginia,' in which the Supreme Court held that the legislature lacks the power to
142. Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097.
143. See supra note 5.
144. Plaut 1, 789 F. Supp. at 234. See also Johnson v. CIGNA, 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1100 (D.Colo.
1992) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that litigants have vested rights in final judgments and
that Congress has no power to take away those vested rights through later legislation.").
145. Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1107.
146. Plaut 1, 789 F. Supp. at 235.
147. To reinstate a claim the plaintiffs must prove that their claim was timely filed under the state
statute of limitations as it existed on June 19, 1991, and that their case was dismissed pursuant to the
statute of limitations found in the Lampf decision. Section 27A(b) provides that the limitation period
for a claim under Section 10b or Rule lOb-5 commenced on or before June 19, 1991; (1) which was
dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and (2) which would have been timely filed
under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of
retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff. 15
U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (West Supp. 1992) (this section does not authorize reinstatement of a claim that
would have been time-barred under the principles applicable on June 19, 1991).
148. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
149. McDaniel, 855 F.2d at 810-12 (lth Cir. 1988) ("Congress' power to create new causes of
action, new legal rights, or impose previously unrecognized duties, does not permit it to disturb a right
that vests as the result of a judgment."); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102. 123-24 (1898)
("when . . . actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights creat-
ed thereby ceases.").
150. See Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 310-16 (1945) (where defendant's "statu-
tory immunity from suit had [not) been fully adjudged so that legislative action deprived it of a final
judgment in its favor", due process is not violated by restoration of remedy to the plaintiff); Campbell
v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
151. 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898).
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take away rights that have been vested by final judgment:
It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once
vested by a judgment. Legislation may. act on subsequent proceedings, may abate
actions pending, but when these actions have passed into judgment the power of
the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases.2 -
Section 27A(b), [that which resurrects claims dismissed with prejudice under the
Lampf decision] clearly abridges the doctrine of vested rights. Defendants to lOb-5
claims whose cases were dismissed under Lampf, face the same problems as the parties
in McCullough, namely an over-zealous legislature.
E. Legislative History as Evidence of Separation of Powers Violation.
The legislative history of Section 27A clearly indicates that Congress intended to
target Rule lOb-5 defendants and hold them responsible under a special rule of deci-
sion.' By enacting Section 27A, Congress did not overrule the Beam decision in all
cases."M Defendants in claims other than lOb-5 will still be subject to Beam for retro-
active application of a new rule of law. This intent evidences a political reaction to the
controversy caused by courts applying Lampf retroactively.
There is no doubt that the motivation and the intent behind the law was to hold
out certain Rule lOb-5 defendants for special treatment under the law.'55 As the legis-
lative history is a proper place to ascertain whether federal enactment is unconstitution-
al, there is no doubt as to the status of Section 27A." The legislative history reflects
not an intent to clarify federal law and provide a single cogent method for determining
timeliness, but an intent to single out the most egregious offenders of Rule lOb-5. As
Judge Batchelder recognized in Plaut, Senator Bryan himself referenced particular
defendants and singled them out as being the target of the new law.'57 Secondly, the
legislative history evidences a clear intent to resurrect final judgments, and make via-
ble claims that were fully adjudicated or dismissed with prejudice.'58 Both of these
examples show that the law cannot be characterized by plaintiffs or the United
States,' "59 as either a change in the underlying securities law, or an exercise of
Congress' power to administer the Constitution.
152. Id.
153. 137 CONG. REc. Hi1812 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mackey, MICH., "[Tihe
Supreme Court signed over a multi-billion dollar check to Michael Milken, Charles Keating, and a
coalition of special interests which produced the financial wreckage of the 1980s."); 137 CONG. REC.
S18,624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan, "We are only addressing the most imme-
diate problem - the unfair application of the Supreme Court's Lampf decision to cases that were pend-
ing at the time that the decision came down."). Sen. Bryan also explicitly referenced noted securities
defendants, the Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l, Drexel Burnham, E.F. Hutton, Ivan Boesky, Mi-
chael Milken, Salomon Brothers, and Lincoln Federal Savings by name.
154. Brichard, Securities Lit. 788 F. Supp. at 1103, ("What Section 27A did was to say that the
Lampf rule should not, contrary to the Beam and Lampf decisions, be applied by federal courts to
existing lOb-5 cases.").
155. See supra note 151.
156. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (ruling that when the legisla-
tive history, "affirmatively" and "clearly" confirms the suspicion of unconstitutionality, the court must
acknowledge it).
157. Plaut II, 1 F.3d at 1499.
158. Id.
159. When acting as intervenor as a matter of right when the constitutionality of a law is chal-
lenged. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).
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F. Analysis of the Treatment Section 27A has Received Prior to the Grant of
Certiorari
1. The Sixth Circuit's Response to Section 27A, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms
The Sixth Circuit was the first appellate court to rule that Section 27A was un-
constitutional."6° Judge Batchelder, who wrote the majority opinion, ruled Section
27A an impermissible violation of the separation of powers, because it disturbed final
judgments between private litigants. 6" The court also held that the acts of Congress,
in debating and enacting Section 27A, were violative of the vested rights doctrine
enunciated in McCullough v. Maryland.62 Additionally, the court recognized that the
Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Audubon was inapplicable to support a claim of
constitutionality.163 That decision, Judge Batchelder wrote, concerned the amendment
of an existing statute and therefore did not reach questions of whether Congress in-
fringed on Article III's grant of power to the judiciary."6
2. District Court Responses to Section 27A
The first district court to rule that Section 27A violated the Separation of Powers
Doctrine rendered its opinion in TGX v. Simmons." The District Court relied on the
holding in Beam"6 to determine that Congress had impermissibly entered into the
realm of the Supreme Court's province. The court ruled that Section 27A breached the
"selective prospectivity constitutionally proscribed in Beam."'6
Two cases decided by Judge Babcock of Colorado support the view of Judge
Beer, albeit for somewhat different reasons.' In the first decision, Bank of Denver v.
Southeastern Capital Group, Judge Babcock ruled that:
Congress did not retroactively amend the section to state an express limitations
period. Rather, Congress selected a discrete category of federal cases, those pend-
ing on June 19, 1991, and directed federal courts hearing these cases to ignore the
Supreme Court's binding interpretation of rule 1Ob-5 set out in Lampf Congress
thus effectively acted as a 'super-appellate court,' overturning Lampf without re-
placing that decision with any new law."6
Judge Babcock believed Congress had donned the traditional robes of the judicia-
ry and usurped the core judicial function of the Article III courts. 7' His view comes
directly from his interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services.' In Nixon, the Court set forth its test to determine when
160. Plaut II, 1 F.3d 1487, 1499.
161. Id. at 1493.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1495-96.
164. Id. at 1496.
165. 786 F. Supp. at 587.
166. Id. at 594.
167. Id.
168. Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D.Colo. 1992); John-
son v. CIGNA, 789 F. Supp. 1098 (D.Colo. 1992).
169. 789 F. Supp. at 1097.
170. Id.
171. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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an act of Congress disrupts the proper balance between the branches of government.
The test rests on whether the actions of one branch prevent another branch from ac-
complishing its constitutionally assigned functions." Only where the potential for
disruption is present must a federal court determine whether the impact is justified by
an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress's constitutional authori-
ty."' Judge Beer determined that in enacting Section 27A Congress did exactly what
the Nixon Court prohibited. In the end, Judge Babcock's opinion described how Con-
gress could have permissibly accomplished what they hoped to in Section 27A, but did
not, either for political reasons or because of oversight.'74
The second decision rendered by Judge Babcock, addressed Section 27A(b) in a
Fifth Amendment context, believing that Congress could not upset final judgments.
Judge Babcock reasoned that since "Congress does not have the power to upset final
judgments,"'75 the previously dismissed action could not be revived. In the end,
Judge Babcock seems to have mixed Beer's position with a healthy dose of James
Beam to reach this conclusion.
3. Support for Section 27A: The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits Use Seattle
Audubon to Uphold Constitutionality
In Anixter v. Home-Stake Productions Co. 76 and Henderson v. Scientific-Atlan-
ta Inc.'77 respectively, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits held that Section 27A is con-
stitutional. Basing their decisions on Seattle Audubon, 78 these courts held that Sec-
tion 27A was a change in existing law, rather than the creation of a new federal rule.
An analysis of the two opinions demonstrates that they suffer from the same legal
fallacy as criticized by Judge Batchelder in Plaut1
79
In Henderson, the Eleventh Circuit in a 2-1 decision, held that Section 27A did
not violate due process or separation-of-powers principles. The majority reversed the
lower court's dismissal of a securities fraud class action,"8 accepting the plaintiffs'
claim that the amendment creating Section 27A, should be applied to this suit and
requiring the lower court to reinstate their case. 8'
The majority also rejected defendant Scientific-Atlanta's claims that retroactive
application would violate due process and equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment.'82 The majority found that Section 27A presents no separation-of-pow-
ers problems because it "has not interfered with the judicial process. The Act does not
require courts to make any particular findings of fact or applications of law to
fact."' 83 "Section 27A," the Henderson majority observed, "is a classic example of
Congress' practice of 'overruling' a statutory construction by the Supreme Court."'"
172. Id. at 441.
173. Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1095 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443).
174. Id. at 1098.
175. 789 F. Supp. at 1100.
176. 977 F.2d 1549 (10th Cir. 1992).
177. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
178. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1570; Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1552.
179. Plaut I!, 1 F.3d at 1495
180. 971 F.2d at 1570.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 971 F.2d at 1569.
184. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1571, n.4.
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In dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Harry W. Wellford recognized that these courts
have emphasized that Section 27A marked a change in the law, effected through a
partial reversal of a Supreme Court decision. He concluded that the enactment, as
written, impermissibly infringed upon the powers delegated to the courts under Article
The Tenth Circuit ruled in Anixter that "[s]tatutes of limitations traditionally
reside in the legislative branch.""' Indeed, according to one district court, the Su-
preme Court's action in Lampf was "possible only in the absence of a statutory limita-
tions period." ' 7 However, while this area may be the sole province of the Legislative
Branch, Congress did not amend the statute of limitations or change the law. Congress
phrased the law merely to effect the application of a rule of decision in the Judiciary.
The Anixter decision also reduced the significance of Section 27A's effect on the
principle of retroactivity announced in Beam. "Beam was carefully crafted," the Tenth
Circuit observed, "to garner a plurality to agree only that retroactive application of a
rule of law announced in a case was a matter of a choice of law and not of constitu-
tional import." '' U As a result, the Anixter court concluded that Congress's alteration
of the Rule lOb-5 statute of limitations should not be susceptible to a constitutional
challenge.
Both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuit decisions emphasized that Section 27A
directs no factual findings on the merits in a particular case. '89 The provision "merely
turns back the legal clock to the period just prior to Lampf [italics supplied]" and then
leaves it to courts to decide reopened cases on their merits.' Yet, by turning back
the clocks, the district courts reopen decisions that were made final earlier, in direct
opposition to the mandates of McCullough and Klein.'9'
VI. CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that "within our political scheme, the separation of governmental
powers into three coordinate branches is essential to the preservation of liberty."'
192
Under this system, the legislature is to enact laws of general application and the courts
are to decide particular cases arising under those laws and to exercise the exclusive
authority to "say what the law is."'93 Conversely stated, "[tihe judicial power cannot
legislate, nor can the legislative power act judicially."'"
Where acts of the legislative branch prevent the judicial branch from accomplish-
ing its constitutionally assigned functions, Congress "passe[s] over the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power."' 95 While Congress has the power to
change the law underlying federal causes of action, it failed to do so in this case. Sec-
185. Id. at 1572.
186. Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1552.
187. Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 479 n.2.
188. Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1554.
189. Id. at 1552 (The Anixter court noted that "§ 27A does not direct courts to make specific
factual findings or mandate a result in a particular case.").
190. Id. (quoting Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1243).
191. See Piaui iI, 1 F.3d at 1494.
192. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
193. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
194. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 441 (1856) (McLean,
J., dissenting).
195. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 391 (1980).
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tion 27A does not change the law. It does not prescribe a new limitations period, nor
does it add a substantive rule for future litigants. Section 27A merely directs courts to
ignore the Beam decision when they are confronted with lOb-5 claims. In all other
cases, no matter what type of law, Beam is still authoritative. The Court in Beam ex-
plicitly rejected this selective prospectivity, and will do so again in Morgan Stanley &
Co. v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins."9
The entire debacle reflects a counterintuitive way of thinking. According to the
Congressional Record, one of the reasons for passing Section 27A into law, was that
under Lampf as applied by Beam, there would be unfair treatment of the rights of
litigants depending on which state they filed their actions. In states where the one and
three year combination statute was already the law, litigants were unaffected by Lampf.
Therefore, under Section 27A litigants are treated unfairly. Section 27A allows litigants
in one state to press a federal claim that would be untimely in another state. Until
Lampf, the SEC and the courts were in agreement that there was a pressing need for a
uniform federal statute of limitations." It was not until the public responded to
Lampf that Congress decided to remedy the problem of state borrowing. In an effort to
appease their constituents, several members of Congress acted quickly and unconstitu-
tionally.
The relation of the legislature to the judiciary cannot be compromised to promote
the relationship of the legislature to the citizenry. The Supreme Court does not decide
its cases based on public opinion, and laws trumping Supreme Court rulings must not
be enacted merely to appease the public concern. By specifically referencing particular
defendants and citing them as motivation for the law, Congress fell into conflict with
the Klein decision. Their action was entirely political, and did not reflect a rational
evaluation of the proper means of achieving the desired effect.
Unfortunately, the limitations period that the Supreme Court settled on was polit-
ically unpopular. Not a big concern for the Court or the SEC whose interests were
consistent application of the law and the prevention of fraud. The concern by members
of Congress, who with an impending election on the horizon could not sit and allow
the bullies of the junk bond market to escape with the savings of widows and orphans,
was different. 9 ' It is understandable, given the duties of Congress that Section 27A
was the solution they proposed. It is not politically correct to decide an issue in favor
of the rights of defendants; after all, that's the Supreme Court's job.
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